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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEBORAH A. MELLE
Case No. 960657-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Court Below No. 94-42-00105DA

CHARLES M. BOVA,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT
1.

In considering appellee/cross-appellant Ms. Melle's in-

come for purposes of calculating child support and alimony, did the
trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

by

employing

Ms.

Melle's

historical income as a part-time employee rather than creating a
"full-time" income based on what she might earn were she able to
work full time?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dividing the

parties' real and personal property in approximately equal amounts?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by requiring

appellant Dr. Bova to assume the debt on the Home Equity Line of
Credit ("HELC") because he used the HELC for his own benefit?
4.

Is the capital gains tax issue moot?

5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the

tax dependency exemptions for the parties' minor children to the
custodial parent, Ms. Melle, in light of the legal presumption in
favor of awarding such exemptions to the custodial parent?
6.

Was the trial court's award of attorney fees to Ms. Melle

an abuse of discretion based on her inability to pay, Dr. Bova's
ability

to pay, and the reasonableness

of the amount

of fees

incurred?
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT
Ms. Melle agrees with Dr. Bova that all issues he raises on
appeal are treated to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY CROSS-APPELLANT.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Ms. Melle presents

the following

issues

for this Court's

review:
1.

Did the trial court err in basing alimony and child

support on Dr. Bova's alleged current income from his employment as
a physician at the Spine Center, without including his income
earned from the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah?
preserved for appeal at R. 1170.
law and fact.

This issue was

This issue raises questions of

"We review the trial court's conclusions of law with

respect to alimony awards for correctness, but we will not reverse
the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous."

Willey v.

Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996).
2.

Did the trial court properly apply the Utah Uniform Child

Support Guidelines to income in excess of the statutory tables?
-2-

This issue was preserved for appeal at R, 1172-3.
setting

child

support, the trial court

Although in

acts within

its

sound

discretion, its application of statutory guidelines is a question
of law subject to review for correctness.

Ball v. Peterson, 912

P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996).
3.

Did the trial court err in requiring Ms. Melle to file a

joint tax return for the 1994 tax year and in requiring her to bear
the burden of the income tax on the $75,000 IRA withdrawal made by
Dre

Bova?

This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1169-1170.

"Changes will be made [to the property division] only if there was
a

misunderstanding

or misapplication

of

the

law

resulting

in

substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated

against

the

findings, or such

a serious

inequity

resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."

has

Naranjo v.

Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).
4.

Did the trial court err in failing to charge the $16,000

gift made to Dr. Bova's daughter to him in the property division?
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1181.
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.

This issue is
Jefferies v.

Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
The following statute is determinative of the second issue
presented by Ms. Melle for appeal:
Income in excess of tables. If the combined adjusted gross
income exceeds the highest level specified in the [base
combined child support obligation] table, an appropriate and
just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case
-3-

basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
level specified in the table for the number of children due
support.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12 (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Both parties are appealing from the trial court's rulings
regarding property division, child support and alimony, following
trial on October 24-26, 1996, in this divorce action.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Ms. Melle filed this action for divorce on August 3, 1994.
After a three-day trial before the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, the court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce on September 19, 1996.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law attached as "Addendum A;" Decree of Divorce attached as
"Addendum B.")

Ms. Melle moved for a new trial on January 19,

1996, on the basis that, after the trial in this matter, she
discovered financial documents indicating that Dr. Bova had made
the bulk of a $16,000 "gift" to his daughter by a prior marriage
after Ms. Melle filed for divorce.
motion,

and

Dr.

Bova

filed

an

The trial court denied this

appeal

on

February

27, 1997.

Ms. Melle filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 6, 1997.

-4-

C.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

The parties were married on June 28, 1980, and have two sons
born

of

the

marriage:

Mikell

Bova,

Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987.
1.

born

March

8,

1984; and

(R. 1634, 1635 and 1882).

WHILE MS. MELLE'S ADJUSTED GROSS MONTHLY INCOME IS
$2,386, DR. BOVA'S ADJUSTED GROSS MONTHLY INCOME,
$10,583, IS MUCH HIGHER.

Dr. Bova is a physician board-certified in emergency medicine
and specializing in sports medicine.

(R. 2263).

Beginning in 1991

Dra Bova was employed as a physician with the Spine Center in West
Valley City.

(R. 2264).

From the time he commenced employment

there until July 1993, his terms of compensation with the Spine
Center

were

fixed

at

$125,000

per

year.

(R. 2265-67).

In

September 1993 he entered a new contract with the Spine Center
whereby his income was based on collections, which allowed him the
potential to earn more money than he earned under the previous
fixed-income arrangement. (R. 2268, 2281).

However, the parties

separated in 1994, and Dr. Bova's adjusted gross income per month
from the Spine Center in 1994 was $9,583.

(R. 1638).

His work

hours at the Spine Center are 8:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. on Mondays,
Tuesdays and Thursdays, and 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. on Wednesdays
and Fridays, meaning that he works twenty six hours per week to
earn this income from the Spine Center.

(R. 2294-95).

In the spring of 1995 Dr. Bova began working for the Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah reviewing files.

(R. 2299).

The undis-

puted evidence at trial was that Dr. Bova is paid an average of

-5-

$1,000 per month for these services in addition to what he earns at
the Spine Center.

(R. 2299, 2301).

Thus, Dr. Bova's adjusted

gross monthly income is $10,583.
By

contrast, Ms. Melle

is employed

part-time

paralegal at Kipp & Christian in Salt Lake City.

as a nurse

(R. 1637).

Ms.

Melle had always worked on a part-time basis during the marriage
because the parties agreed it would be best for the children to
have a parent with them as much as possible.

(R. 1637, 1908).

At

the time of trial, she worked twenty to thirty hours per week at
Kipp & Christian.

(R. 2163).

However, the trial court multiplied

her hourly wage of $18.50 by the maximum amount of hours she works
in a given week

(thirty hours) to reach a gross monthly income

figure of $2,386.2

(R. 1638).

Dr. Bova has presented no evidence that Ms. Melle could or
should be working on a full-time basis.
cannot feasibly work full time.

To the contrary, Ms. Melle

She was employed for a time at the

Utah Womens' Clinic while she was also working at Kipp & Christian,
In imputing gross monthly income of $9,583 to Dr. Bova, the
court did not consider Dr. Bova's income from the Workers'
Compensation Fund, believing Dr. Bova's income "as set forth on his
W-2 form from the Spine Center [to be] the best indicator of the
Defendant's income prior to the filing of this matter." (R. 1638).
2

Dr. Bova contends that Ms. Melle could be earning more as a
nurse paralegal, pointing out that her hourly wage was higher when
she worked as a nurse paralegal at Snow, Christensen & Martineau
from October 1991 until August 1994, and that during her last month
of employment with Snow, Christensen & Martineau, she made $5.25
per hour more than she currently earns at Kipp & Christian.
(R.
1964, 2464). Nonetheless, Snow, Christensen & Martineau limited
her to working part-time.
(R. 2466).
Additionally, Snow,
Christensen & Martineau terminated her employment, so there is no
evidence to support Dr. Bova's speculative contention. (R. 2464).
-6-

but scheduling conflicts evolved between the two jobs, and she
determined "that one job had to go or the other."

(R. 1976, 1978).

She chose to keep her job with Kipp & Christian because she enjoys
working as a paralegal and earns more money at Kipp & Christian
than she did at the Utah Womens' Clinic.

(R. 1978-79).

She hopes

to work more hours per week at Kipp & Christian eventually, but she
has not received an offer to work there full time.
2.

(R. 1979).

DESPITE THE PARTIES' HIGH COMBINED ADJUSTED GROSS
INCOME AND THE CHILDREN'S LIFESTYLE DURING THE
MARRIAGE, THE COURT DECLINED TO SET CHILD SUPPORT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.12.

The parties stipulated that Ms. Melle should have physical
custody of the children and that the parties would have joint legal
custody, but that Ms. Melle would have decision-making authority
regarding the childrens' activities, including sports activities.
(R. 1635).

The parties also agreed

Dr. Bova would pay child

support irrespective of the amount of days per month he had the
children for visitation.

(R. 1638).

With Dr. Bova's monthly adjusted gross income determined by
the trial court to be $9,583 and Ms. Melle's to be $2,386, the
parties' combined monthly adjusted gross income came to $11,969 for
purposes

of

computing

child

support

obligations.

(R.

1178).

Because the highest combined income provided on the Base Combined
Child Support Obligation Table in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 was
$10,100, Ms. Melle urged Judge Noel to extrapolate beyond the
highest level to determine the child support award, as permitted by
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12.

(R. 1173).
-7-

Ms. Melle explained the

childrens' need for support beyond the guidelines by pointing out
that

the

children

were

accustomed

during

the

marriage

to

participating in numerous sports activities, such as skiing schools
and basketball, that cost more than $4,725 per year.
1919, 1924, 1935-36).

(R. 1173,

She additionally noted that the majority of

her monthly expenditures, such as food and transportation, directly
benefited the children.

Based on this need, Ms. Melle requested

that Dr. Bova's child support obligations be set by extrapolating
3
beyond the Table. (R. 1173). Without explaining the reason for
denying this request, the trial court set Dr. Bova's child support
obligation at $1,400 per month.
3.

(R. 1639).

MONTHLY ALIMONY OF $1200 WAS SET ACCORDING TO MS.
MELLE'S NEEDS, INABILITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF AND THE
CHILDREN, AND DR. BOVA'S ABILITY TO PAY.

In determining an alimony amount, Judge Noel first considered
Ms. Melle's need for spousal support, finding that her monthly

The child support obligation for two children whose parents
have combined income of $10,100 is $1,400. Utah Code Ann. § 78-457.14. The parties' combined income was $1,869 above the highest
level of combined income shown in the Table. According to the
Table, the child support obligation for two children with parents'
combined income of $1,869 is $517. Therefore, extrapolating from
the Table to calculate Dr. Bova's child support requirement by
adding these two figures, his obligation (assuming an adjusted
gross monthly income for Dr. Bova of $9,583) should have been 9/11
of $1,917, or approximately $1,568 per month.
However, if Dr.
Bova's income from the Utah Workers' Compensation Fund is taken
into account (See Point VII of Brief), his adjusted gross monthly
income is $10,853, bringing the parties' combined adjusted gross
monthly income to $2,869 above the highest level of combined income
listed on the Table. The child support obligation for two children
with parents' combined income of $2,869 is $707. Dr. Bova's child
support obligation should be 9/11 of $2,107, or approximately
$1,724 per month.
-8-

expenses total $4,595.

(R. 1640) .

The trial court's assessment

that Ms. Melle needs $4,595 per month to support herself and two
children

is

conservative

in

view

of

the

fact

that

Dr.

Bova

apparently needs $6,545 (the monthly expenses of $8,045 attributed
to him minus $1,400 per month for child support) just to support
himself.

The trial court also examined Dr. Bova's ability to pay

spousal support based on Dr. Bova's monthly expenses of $8,045,
over $1,500 less per month than his adjusted gross monthly income.
(R. 1639-40).

The trial court observed a gap between Ms. Melle's

monthly need of $4,595 and monthly after-tax income of $1,800 and
child support of $1,400 per month and determined the gap could be
partially closed by awarding $1,200 monthly in alimony.

(R. 1639).

Although Dr. Bova claims he barely earns enough to make ends
meet, his lifestyle indicates his ability to pay spousal support.
For example, at the same time he contended he could not afford to
pay the $1,787 monthly mortgage on the parties' marital residence,
he vacationed in Mexico, Florida, and Colorado a total of twenty
days over a five-month period.

(R. 1499-1500).

He also paid over

$24,000 in attorney fees devoted to the divorce by the time of
trial.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 37).

The trial court did not attempt to decrease the amount of
alimony awarded by suggesting that Ms. Melle should be forced to
find

full-time

herself.

employment

to

augment

her

ability

to

support

Rather, the best interests of the children weigh in favor

of Ms. Melle working part time:

-9-

The Court finds that during the course of the marriage,
the Plaintiff has always worked part-time since the birth
of the children. Her part-time work schedule was discussed by the parties and agreed upon by both parties.
In addition the Court finds, based upon the testimony of
Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the children's
welfare that the Plaintiff not work full-time so that she
can be available to the children when they come home from
school. The Court further believes, that based upon the
finances of the parties that the parties can afford this
arrangement.
(R. 1637-38) .
By the same token, Dr. Bova presented no evidence demonstrating that Ms. Melle could locate and be hired for a full-time
job as a nurse paralegal in which she would be able to leave work
in time to be home when the children returned from school.

There

is also no indication that Ms. Melle could obtain a job as a
registered nurse; Ms. Melle's nursing license has lapsed, and in
order

to

renew

her

license,

she

would

have

to

enroll

re-certification program at the University of Utah.

in

a

(R. 2141).

Furthermore, Ms. Melle earns more as a nurse paralegal than she
would as a clinical nurse.
4.

The

IN DIVIDING PROCEEDS OF THE PARTIES' INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT ("IRA"), THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED DR. BOVA'S WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS IN VIOLATION
OF ITS ORDER BUT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE INCOME TAX
CONSEQUENCES
OF THIS
IMPROPER
WITHDRAWAL
ON
MS. MELLE.

parties

contained
(R. 1642).

(R. 2142-43).

$75,000

maintained
at

the

an

IRA

time

of

during
the

the

marriage

parties'

that

separation.

Within two weeks after Ms. Melle filed her complaint

for divorce, the trial court ordered the parties not to dissipate

-10-

the marital assets without the court's prior permission.

(R.

2309) .
Despite the court's order and without its permission, Dr. Bova
subsequently withdrew and spent $57,018.26 from the IRA.
dant's Exhibit 28; R. 1642, 2439).

(Defen-

Dr. Bova claimed that he used

this amount, among other things, to pay state and federal taxes in
the amount of $22,960; to purchase a dining room set for $3,200 for
his new residence; and to give his daughter from his prior marriage
$5,000 in college expenses.

(Defendant's Exhibit 28).

Signifi-

cantly, Dr. Bova has been unable to produce receipts or other
documentation evidencing his purchases and payments even though it
is his practice to try to keep records of purchases over $1,000.
(R. 2311-13).

Based on the lack of evidence beyond Dr. Bova's

self-serving claim that he withdrew and used the $57,018.26 for the
benefit of both parties, the court concluded that the withdrawal
was improper.

(R. 1642).

Dr. Bova also withdrew approximately

$5,000 for an unknown purpose and does not contend that this amount
was used to both parties' benefit.

(R. 2308).

The court also

found this withdrawal to be improper, bringing the total withdrawal
amount from the IRA considered to be improper and for the benefit
of Dr. Bova alone to $62,100.

(R. 1642).

On the other hand, Dr. Bova properly withdrew $12,900 from the
IRA after the divorce action commenced upon obtaining the court's
permission.

(R. 1642).

From this amount, $6,000 was used to pay

a portion of the each party's attorney fees; $3,000 was used to pay
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the custodial evaluator, Dr. Stewart; and $3,900 was used allegedly
to pay medical bills related to his suicide attempt and cosmetic
surgery, although Dr. Bova was unable to produce these bills.

(R.

1642) .
Because Dr. Bova improperly withdrew $62,100 from the IRA, the
court determined he should be required to pay the tax penalty for
this withdrawal in the amount of $6,210.

(R. 1642-43).

Regarding

the $12,900 Dr. Bova properly withdrew, the Court estimated the
penalty for withdrawal to be $1,290 and ordered the parties to
split this penalty equally.

(R. 1642).

Ms. Melle had already filed her 1994 state and federal income
tax returns by the time of trial.

However, the court ordered the

parties to file joint returns for 1994 that included the $75,000
IRA amount as income, finding that "the parties will save money on
federal and state taxes if they are required to file jointly for
tax year 1994."

(R. 1642).

The court found that the income tax

owed due to the inclusion of the IRA withdrawal as income would be
approximately $16,000 and ordered the parties to pay the 1994 taxes
equally.

(R. 1662) .
5.

THE BALANCE OF A HOME EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT USED
FOR DR. BOVA'S BENEFIT WAS CHARGED TO HIM.

During the marriage Dr. Bova took out a Home Equity Line of
Credit ("HELC") against the parties' marital residence in his name.
(R. 1641) . When the parties separated in August 1994, the HELC had
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a balance of approximately $18,000 ; at the time of trial, it had
a balance of approximately $24,000.

(R. 1641).

Dr. Bova used the

HELC for his own purposes, including purchasing Sea Doos watercraft
for $12,500 in 1993.

(R. 1641, 1644-45).

Although Ms. Melle made

it clear to Dr. Bova that she did not approve of this purchase, he
purchased the watercraft anyway.

(R. 2175) . He additionally used

the HELC in 1993 to pay for attorney fees in the amount of $3,000
without Ms. Melle's knowledge.

(R. 2176, 2177).

Dr. Bova used the remainder of the HELC to pay some of his
temporary court-ordered alimony obligations. (R. 1641).

The trial

court found that this portion of the HELC also benefited Dr. Bova
alone rather than both parties:
[A] substantial portion of that amount of the line of
credit that exceeds $18,000 was incurred by the defendant
to make mortgage payments and temporary alimony payments
as ordered by the court. To allow those amount [sic] to
be deducted from the sales proceeds of the home prior to
the division of equity would have the effect of requiring
the plaintiff to pay one half of the temporary alimony
and support awarded to her. This, of course, would be
unfair.
(R. 1361).

Accordingly, Judge Noel ruled that Dr. Bova should pay

the entire balance of the HELC.

(R. 1641).

4

Dr. Bova maintains the balance was actually $14,000 and that
Judge Noel's "confusion" in this regard is tantamount to error.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 27) .
If the trial court indeed was
incorrect, this "error" is not prejudicial. Whatever the balance
was, Dr. Bova failed to present any evidence that any portion of
the HELC was used for anything other than his own purposes. The
legal ramification of this, that Dr. Bova must assume the whole
balance of the HELC, remains unaffected.
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6.

THE TRIAL COURT EQUALLY SPLIT THE EQUITY IN THE
MARITAL RESIDENCE.

The parties acquired a marital residence in Park City that was
valued at $385,000, with equity of $208,835 at the time of trial.
(R. 1641, 1661).

Judge Noel awarded possession of the home to Ms.

Melle and ordered that Dr. Bova make the monthly mortgage payment
of $1,789 until the house was sold or refinanced by Ms. Melle.
1662).

(R.

Dr. Bova receives a credit of $1,789 against his monthly

combined child support and alimony obligation of $2,600 in exchange
for paying the mortgage.

(R. 1662).

The court divided home equity equally between the parties,
subject

to offsets

in Dr. Bova's

share of the equity.

From

Dr. Bova's share of $104,417.50, the trial court determined that
the following amounts should be deducted: $29,597, representing Ms.
Melle's share of an IRA account maintained during the marriage;
$15,000, representing the amount of Ms. Melle's attorney fees Judge
Noel ordered Dr. Bova to pay; and Dr. Bova's share of the parties'
1994 income taxes, including most of a $7,500 tax incurred because
Dr. Bova withdrew funds from the IRA early and in violation of a
previous court order.
7.

(R. 1643-44).

THE COURT EQUITABLY SPLIT THE MARITAL PROPERTY.

Judge Noel awarded Dr. Bova the following items of property:
Household items
(deducting value of Sea Doos)
1992 Subaru SVX
Zions Checking Account
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$11,050
$ 2,825
$
250

IRA Withdrawal

$75,0005

Total

$89r725

(R. 1645).

In arriving at a value for the household items awarded

to Dr. Bova, Judge Noel relied on an appraisal of all marital
property

in

independent
$18,770.

his

possession

appraisal

performed

company,

which

(Defendant's Exhibit 25).

by

Family

valued

the

Affairs,

an

property

at

From this amount, Judge Noel

deducted $7,500, which was the value of the Sea Doos at the time of
trial, rather than the purchase price of the Sea Doos, which was
$12,500.

(R. 1645).

The following items were awarded to Ms. Melle:
Household items
1994 Subaru
Feb. 1995 pension distributions
Total

$14,636
$ 1,795
$ 1,200
$17,631

(R. 1645).
To compensate partially for the fact that Dr. Bova was awarded
$72,094 more in property than Ms. Melle, the court awarded her
$29,597 as her share of the IRA, which amount the court directed to
be

deducted

residence.

from

Dr.

Bova's

share

of

equity

in

the

marital

(R. 1645).

5

Including $12,900 Dr. Bova withdrew with the court's permission to pay the $3,000 fee of the custodial evaluator, $3,000 in
attorney fees to each party's attorney, and $3,900 allegedly for
medical bills. Dr. Bova was unable to produce any of these bills,
but he testified that a portion of the bills was used to pay for
medical care received during his suicide attempt and cosmetic
surgery.
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8.

THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE
CHILDREN TO MS. MELLE AS THE CUSTODIAL PARENT AND
GAVE DR. BOVA THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE THE EXEMPTIONS
FROM MS. MELLE.

Regarding the disposition of the income tax exemptions claimed
for dependents, the court ruled:
The tax exemptions for the minor children shall be
awarded to the Plaintiff; however, if it should appear
that the Defendant may gain greater tax advantage by
claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns,
the Defendant shall be entitled to "purchase" the tax
exemptions from Plaintiff. The purchase price shall be
the difference in taxes owing if the Plaintiff uses the
exemption and that amount of taxes owing if she does not
use the exemption.
(R. 1665).
9.

THE COURT AWARDED MS. MELLE $15,000 IN ATTORNEY
FEES INCURRED IN THE DIVORCE BASED ON NEED.

Judge Noel

granted

Ms. Melle's

request

that

Dr. Bova be

required to pay at least a portion of attorney fees she incurred in
this action on the ground of need, stating:
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far
in excess of that income earned by the Plaintiff. The
Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course
of these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter
of that earned by the Defendant and that all of the
Plaintiff s monthly income is used to pay for necessary
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she
has paid her monthly living expenses. (R. 1647).
Indeed, Dr. Bova expended $24,573.09 in attorney fees and
costs by the time of trial.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 37).

Speci-

fically, he expended $8,698 in fees and costs before this action
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commenced,

to Craig

Peterson

and

Sandy

Dolowitz.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 37). He initially retained Mary Corporon to represent him
in this action, and incurred fees and costs from her of $4,167.13.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). He then retained the services of Helen
Christian beginning
$5,090.54.

in November

1994, who charged

a total of

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 37). Finally, Ken Okasaki became

his attorney in June 1995 and had charged a total of $6,617.42 by
August 1995.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 7 ) . 6

In stark contrast, the trial court awarded only $15,036 in
attorney

fees to Ms. Melle.

(R. 1645).

Dr. Bova's

counsel

stipulated that the attorney fees charged by Evelyn Saunders, who
represented Ms. Melle at trial, were related to the work performed
and did not argue that the amount of fees incurred by Ms. Melle was
unreasonable.

(R. 2451).

The court also viewed this amount as

necessary and reasonable, pointing out that
the Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five
motions made by the Defendant to lower his child support
and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each
time the by Court; and that the Plaintiff was forced to
incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to
compel to obtain information regarding the Defendant's
financial records.
(R. 1647).

By the time Dr. Bova commenced this appeal, he switched
attorneys to Ann Wassermann. (Notice of Appeal dated October 15,
1996).
He finally settled on his current counsel in May 1997.
(Substitution of Counsel dated May 8, 1997) .
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10.

JUDGE NOEL DENIED MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF DISSIPATION OF MARITAL ASSETS.

At trial, Dr. Bova revealed that he had set up a trust for his
daughter from his previous marriage in the amount of $16,000.

(R.

2551) . Dr. Bova claimed that Ms. Melle knew of this trust and when
it was created and that he did not deposit any money in the trust
after the parties separated.

(R. 2551, 2561).

However, Ms. Melle

testified she was not aware until trial that Dr. Bova had created
a trust for his daughter and was not aware that the balance in that
trust was $16,000.

(R. 2563-64).

In January 1996, several months before Judge Noel issued his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Ms. Melle moved for a new
trial

based

upon

newly-discovered

dissipated marital assets.

evidence

(R. 1186-1190).

that

Dr. Bova

had

Before trial com-

menced, Ms. Melle sent interrogatory requests to Dr. Bova asking
him to list all accounts in his name.

(R. 1179).

He failed to

list any trust account for any of his children, including his
daughter.

(R. 1179-1180).

After the trial, Ms. Melle was cleaning

out the desk Dr. Bova used when the parties were married in the
marital home and discovered
Discovery

a financial

statement

from Strong

Fund relating to the trust for Dr. Bova's daughter.

(R. 1180-81).

Although Dr. Bova received other financial state-

ments addressed to the parties' marital residence, these statements
had been mailed to a private post office box in Park City in
Dr. Bova's name.

(R. 1180).

According to the financial statement,
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the value of the daughter's account as of June 1994, just prior to
the parties' separation, was $3,232,24.

(R. 1181, 1183).

Thus,

Dr. Bova deposited $13,000 into the trust account after the parties
were separated.

(R. 1181).

Ms. Melle requested a new trial to

determine if Dr. Bova had in fact dissipated marital assets and, if
so, to seek a credit in the amount of one-half of the marital funds
improperly diverted.

(R. 1181) .

The court denied Ms. Melle's motion, stating without explanation that she could have discovered information regarding when the
bulk of funds was deposited into the trust account before trial.
(R. 1855) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS RELATING TO DR. BOVA'S APPEAL
POINT I:
calculating

The trial court acted within its discretion in

Ms. Melle's

monthly

income

for

child

support

and

alimony purposes based on her current salary and her historical
status as a part-time employee.

The trial court was not obliged to

accept Dr. Bova's position that her income should be determined
based on what she might earn as a full-time worker, particularly
when he presented no evidence that she should work full-time or
that she would be able to find a full-time job paying more than
what she currently earns as a part-time nurse paralegal.
POINT II:

The trial court divided the marital property in an

equitable manner.

It split the equity in the marital residence in

half, then made appropriate deductions from Dr. Bova's half for
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amounts owing to Ms. Melle for attorney fees and her share of an
IRA,

and

for amounts

owing

in income

taxes.

It divided

the

personal property fairly, awarding each party the value of property
in his or her possession and giving Ms. Melle her share of the
funds withdrawn from the IRA by Dr. Bova.
POINT III:

The trial court properly assessed to Dr. Bova the

debt on a home equity line of credit he took out and used for his
benefit.
POINT IV:

The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 eliminates capital

gains tax on sales of primary personal residences up to $250,000.
Dr. Bova's

claim that capital

handled improperly is moot.

gains tax on the residence was

Even if it was not moot, the trial

court cannot be expected to rule on tax matters that are purely
speculative.
POINT V:

It was proper for the trial court to award the tax

dependency exemptions for the parties' minor children to Ms. Melle,
the custodial parent.
awarding

There is a legal presumption in favor of

this exemption to the custodial parent, and Dr. Bova

presented no evidence to the trial court to rebut this presumption.
Any error by the trial court in this regard would not be prejudicial,

as

the

trial

court's

ruling

affords

Dr.

Bova

the

opportunity to purchase the exemptions from Ms. Melle.
POINT VI; The trial court's award of $15,000 in attorney fees
to Ms. Melle was reasonable in light of Ms. Melle' s need and the
small

amount

of

fees

incurred

compared
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to

those

incurred

by

Dr. Bova.

Dr. Bova has certainly not had trouble paying his own

attorney fees in this past, and this obligation should pose no
financial hardship for him.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MS. MELLE'S CROSS-APPEAL
POINT VII;

The trial court erred in failing to consider Dr.

Bova's income from his second job when arriving at a monthly income
in determining the alimony and child support awards.

Taking his

total employment income into account more accurately reflects his
ability to pay alimony and child support.

When weighed against Ms.

Melle's need for further support and her inability to earn more
income, consideration of income from his second job becomes particularly justified.
POINT VIII:

In computing Dr. Bova's monthly child support

obligation, the trial court should have extrapolated beyond the
highest combined income figure listed in the Utah Uniform Child
Support Guidelines.

One of the guiding principles in assessing

child support is to maintain the children in a standard of living
that approximates as nearly as possible the standard of living
during their parents' marriage.

The court ignored this principle,

but the children's needs warrant an award of higher child support
award.
POINT IX:

The trial court erred in requiring Ms. Melle to

file a joint tax return for 1994 that required her to bear the
burden of income tax on the $75,000 IRA withdrawal.
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POINT X:

Ms. Melle was unaware until the trial in this matter

that Dr. Bova had created a trust account for his daughter from a
prior marriage and was depositing marital assets into it.

She only

learned after the trial that he had deposited most of the current
balance in this trust account after the parties had separated.
Because Dr. Bova improperly diverted marital assets and concealed
his actions, the trial court should have granted her request for a
new trial on this issue.
POINT XI:

Ms. Melle requests that she be awarded attorney

fees incurred on appeal due to her inability to pay these fees.
ARGUMENT ON APPELLANT'S ISSUES
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
DECLINING TO IMPUTE INCOME FROM A FULL-TIME
JOB IN SOME UNKNOWN AMOUNT TO MS. MELLE IN
CALCULATING DR. BOVA'S CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS.
Judge Noel determined Ms. Melle's monthly income from her
employment as a nurse paralegal for purposes of computing alimony
and child support by multiplying her hourly wage by the maximum
amount of hours she works in any given week.

Using the maximum

number of hours she works in a week overinflates her actual income,
but Ms. Melle accepts the monthly income amount arrived at by the
trial court, $2,386, for purposes of this appeal.
During the entirety of the parties' marriage, Ms. Melle never
worked full-time because the parties agreed that their children
should have a parent with them as much as possible and that she
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should be that parent.

While she has worked as a nurse paralegal

she has always arranged her work schedule so she can be home when
the children return from school.
accordance

with

the

She continues to do so today, in

recommendation

of

custodial

evaluator

Dr. Elizabeth Stewart that it is in the children's best interests
and within the financial means of the parties to have a parent at
home for the children in the afternoon.
Although he acknowledges that Ms. Melle should be home for the
children when they return from school, Dr. Bova contends that she
can work full-time at her present job and leave work each day in
time to be home for the children in the afternoons.

Dr. Bova

concocted a work schedule for Ms. Melle calling for her to go to
work four weekend days each month and a couple of full weekdays
each month when the children are visiting Dr. Bova, and to work a
full day each week during the summer.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 34).

Basically, this schedule assumes Ms. Melle will be working whenever
Dr. Bova has the children for visitation.

This schedule also

assumes Kipp & Christian will permit Ms. Melle to work whenever
Dr. Bova wants her to work, even weekends, when Kipp & Christian
is not open for business.

7

Dr. Bova attempts to turn Ms. Melle's testimony that she has
a "flexible schedule" with Kipp & Christian into an admission that
she can come and go as she pleases, no matter what time of the day
or how many hours she works in a given day. Ms. Melle testified
that her schedule requires her to work twenty hours each week, but
that she could not load these hours into two days of ten hours per
day.
(R. 2470).
Rather, she must work "regularly," putting in
about an equal amount of hours each day to reach twenty hours. (R.
2470).
There is no evidence that she
can work when Dr. Bova
-23-

Most importantly, Dr. Bova assumes in creating a full-time
work schedule for Ms. Melle that Kipp & Christian needs a full-time
nurse paralegal and would allow her to work as a full-time nurse
paralegal.

He does not offer any evidence, as he cannot, to

support these assumptions.
Dr. Bova complains that the trial court should have imputed
full-time work income to Ms. Melle, yet he does not demonstrate
that she has the ability to work full-time.

There is no evidence

that Kipp & Christian would hire her full-time and no evidence of
o

what it would pay her if it did hire her full-time.

There is no

evidence she could juggle a second part-time job and still be home
when the children return from school.

Ms. Melle tried to work a

second part-time job while she was with Kipp & Christian, but it
proved to be unworkable because she had problems with overlapping
schedules.

Finally, there is no evidence that she could find a

full-time job as a nurse paralegal, as a nurse, or as something
else that would increase her monthly earnings and allow her to be
home in time for the childrens' return from school.

would like her to, nor is there evidence that Kipp & Christian
would agree with Dr. Bova's unsubstantiated assumption that she
would be allowed to work forty hours a week.
o

One cannot assume that Kipp & Christian would pay her $18.50
per hour, her rate of pay for twenty hours per week, if she worked
forty hours per week. In fact, it is likely that her hourly wage
would decrease for a forty-hour work week, since the law firm would
be required to provide her with costly benefits to which full-time
employees are entitled.
-24-

Had the trial court accepted Dr. Bova's argument that fulltime income should be imputed to Ms. Melle, it would have been
engaging in pure conjecture.

It properly declined to do so.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT EQUITABLY DIVIDED THE MARITAL
PROPERTY.
In distributing assets of the marital estate, "there is no
fixed rule or formula. . . . The trial court may make such orders
in relation to the parties as may be equitable."
Burnham,

716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986).

Burnham v.

The trial court acted

within its broad discretion in dividing the marital property.
The equity in the parties' marital residence of $208,835 was
apportioned equally to the parties.

While Judge Noel ordered that

certain deductions be made from Dr. Bova's half of the equity,
these deductions were reasonable and necessary.

First, the trial

court determined that Ms. Melle was entitled to a share of the IRA,
a marital asset, in the amount of $29,597, and that this should be
deducted from Dr. Bova's share of the home equity.
also determined

that

$15,000

should

The trial court

be deducted

to cover Ms.

Melle's reasonable and necessary attorney fees, and that his share
of the parties' 1994 income taxes should be deducted.
The trial court also split the parties' remaining property as
equitably as possible.

Dr. Bova was awarded $89,725 in personal

property, while Ms. Melle received only $17,631.

Even taking into

account the court's award of $29,597 to Ms. Melle as her share of
the IRA, which increases the value of property awarded to her to
-25-

$48,228 and decreases the value of property awarded to Dr. Bova to
$60,128, the disparity in Dr. Bova's favor remains.
In spite of this, Dr. Bova views the property distribution as
unfair.

While he agrees the trial court was correct in refusing to

treat the Sea Doos as marital property and thus deducted the Sea
Doos from the value of household items awarded to him, he maintains
the trial court used an incorrect figure.

Dr. Bova purchased the

Sea Doos for $12,500, but the independent appraiser placed their
value at the time of trial at $7,500.

The court deducted this

latter figure, rather than the purchase price, in reaching a total
of $11,050 in household items awarded to Dr. Bova.

The independent

appraiser determined the value of the household items awarded by
relying on the value of each item, rather than the purchase price.
The appraiser placed the total value of Dr. Bova's household items
at $18,770, and the Sea Doos constituted $7,500 of this amount.
(Defendant's

Exhibit

25).

Had

the

trial

court

deducted

the

purchase price of the Sea Doos from the $18,770, the result would
have been to undervalue the remaining

items, which would have

worked an unfairness upon Ms. Melle.
Dr. Bova also faults the trial court for including his household items (minus the Sea Doos) in the property division when he
allegedly bought these items with the IRA funds he improperly
withdrew.

Since the full value of the $75,000 IRA is also included

in the property division, Dr. Bova complains he is being "doubleassessed" for his household items.
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Dr. Bova ignores the fact that

there is no proof he purchased these items with the IRA proceeds.
Even if he could produce documentation tracing the funds for these
items to the IRA, he is not being double-assessed for the personal
property.

The difference between what he paid for each household

item and what

the appraiser values each item at for property

division purposes is substantial.

For instance, whereas Dr. Bova

testified he purchased a dining room set for $3,200, the appraiser
gave it a value of only $750.

Given the timing of the purchase and

the source of purchase funds, the depreciation of these items has
to be assessed to their owner, Dr. Bova.
Third, he asserts that the trial court overvalued the IRA
awarded to him at $75,000 when he allegedly did not receive the
benefit of all of the proceeds.

While it is true that $12,900 from

the IRA was used to pay marital debts, the trial court ultimately
took this into account in dividing marital assets.

Rather than

awarding Ms. Melle home equity equal to fifty percent of the IRA
funds, the trial court awarded her $29,597, or fifty per cent "less
one half of the $12,900 representing the portion . . . the Court
allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both
parties."

(R. 1643-44).

The $12,900 withdrawal is the only legal withdrawal Dr. Bova
made on the IRA.

He withdrew the remaining $62,100 in violation of

the court's order against dissipating marital assets.

Ironically,

he has produced no documentation to support his claim that he used
some of the illegally-withdrawn IRA funds to pay state and federal
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taxes to the benefit of both parties, yet he would have had such
documentation if the funds had been withdrawn with the court's
permission because the court would have overseen the withdrawal.
His bare assertion that he used the illegally-withdrawn funds for
the parties' benefit was properly disregarded by the trial court in
dividing the IRA proceeds between the parties.

In Painter v.

Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988), a husband withdrew funds
from a retirement account in violation of a court's restraining
order

prohibiting

property.

the

parties

from

disposing

of

any

marital

In its property distribution, the court credited one-

half of the original amount of the fund to the wife.

The husband

appealed this decision, asserting that he used some of the funds he
had withdrawn

to pay

loans that benefited

the wife, as well.

However, the husband failed to present any documentation supporting
his assertion, and the court of appeals determined the trial court
did

not

assertion.

abuse

its

discretion

in

disbelieving

the

husband's

See also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) (one

half of value of marital property corporation awarded to wife
despite husband's allegation that corporation was encumbered by a
loan made by his pre-marital

company; husband

failed to carry

burden of proof on existence of loan because he produced no papers
documenting loan).
Dr. Bova cannot show that the property division amounted to a
NV

serious

inequity"

prejudicial error."

against

him

resulting

in

"substantial

and

Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah 1978).
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Instead, he was awarded more than half the value of the marital
property.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ASSESSING THE HELC DEBT TO DR. BOVA.
Dr. Bova's suggestion that "the burden of the HELC must be
equally shared between the parties'' (Brief of Appellant, p. 30) is
insupportable in view of the fact that the benefits of the HELC
were not shared equally by the parties.

Dr. Bova used the HELC

during the marriage to purchase the Sea Doos, of which he was
awarded possession in the divorce decree, against the protests of
Ms. Melle; and he drew on it to pay for his attorney fees without
Ms. Melle's knowledge.
Dr. Bova contends he was forced to use the remainder of the
HELC balance to pay some of his temporary court-ordered alimony
obligations
destitute.

and

mortgage

payments

because

he

was

financially

Considering Dr. Bova's high income, his penchant for

expensive vacations and ability to pay considerable attorney fees
during the divorce proceedings, it is not surprising that Dr. Bova
fails to explain how it was that his adjusted gross monthly income
of over $9,000 could not cover the temporary support payments.

At

any rate, had the court required Ms. Melle to assume debt that had
been incurred to pay her alimony and mortgage payments, she would
have effectively been paying for half of her own spousal support,
which would have been an unfair result.
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Finally,

Dr. Bova points out that the amount of temporary

spousal support he paid each month during the divorce proceedings
was higher than the permanent spousal support awarded by the court
in the Decree of Divorce.

He argues that Ms. Melle was thus

overpaid in temporary spousal support and should have to assume a
portion of the HELC debt in an amount equal to this overpayment.
Retroactive

reduction

of a spousal

support payment

is discre-

tionary, and the court acted within its discretion in refusing to
make

Ms. Melle, whose monthly

income

is one

quarter

Dr. Bova's, pay back money she had already spent.
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992).
indication

that

Dr.

Bova

ever

that

of

Crockett v.

Moreover, there is no

petitioned

for

a

retroactive

adjustment in alimony after his permanent alimony obligation was
set by the trial court, and he is barred from asking for such
relief on appeal.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO RULE ON A
TAX ISSUE THAT WAS SPECULATIVE AND WAS NOT
PROPERLY RAISED.
In

its

minute

entry

following

trial,

the

court

awarded

possession of the marital residence to Ms. Melle and allowed her
the option of refinancing the home or selling it.

The court did

not include a ruling on who would bear any capital gains tax if the
house was ultimately sold for more than its basis.

Commenting on

the court's minute entry, Dr. Bova did not mention capital gains
taxes, but vaguely spoke of capital gains:
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The Court has also failed to consider the capital gains
consequences.
The capital gains should be divided
equally or prorated based upon who derives the most
profit from the sale of the house. (R. 1232).
If

Dr. Bova was intending by this confusing statement to ask the

Court for a ruling on who would pay any capital gains tax on the
sale of the home, he did not make his intention clear enough to
qualify as a preservation of this issue for appeal.

The mere

mention of error before the trial court, without giving the court
an explanation for why something constitutes error, is insufficient
to preserve an issue for appeal.

Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360

(Utah App. 1996) .
At any rate, the federal tax law on capital gains was recently
changed in such a way to render Dr. Bova's argument moot.

He

claims that the home's tax basis is $265,000 and that the home
would sell for its appraised value of $385,00, resulting in a capital gain of $120,000.

Under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, §

312(a), effective for capital gains incurred after May 1997, there
is an exemption from tax for gain on the sale of a home resulting
9

in a capital gain of less than $250,000.

Additionally, the trial court was under no obligation to
consider speculative future tax consequences associated with the
sale of marital property. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah
App. 1990). The house has not yet been sold. There is no evidence
of what the home's basis is, beyond Dr. Bova's undocumented
assertion that it is $265,000, and no evidence of what the purchase
price of the home, since there is no buyer yet.
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POINT V
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED THE TAX DEPENDENCY
EXEMPTIONS TO MS. MELLE AS THE CUSTODIAL
PARENT.
Judge Noel awarded the tax exemptions for the parties' minor
children to Ms. Melle, subject to Dr. Bova's right to purchase them
by paying her the amount of tax benefit she would receive if she
claimed them.
The trial court's ruling does not preclude

Dr. Bova from

claiming the children as dependency exemptions; if he would receive
a greater tax advantage than Ms. Melle, he can purchase the exemptions from her.

The trial court's position on the exemptions

comports with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.21

(1994), allowing the

court to consider, among other things, the relative tax benefit to
each party.

Judge Noel was not required to explain the denial of

Dr. Bova's request for the exemptions.

The trial court acted

within its discretion in awarding the exemptions to the parent with
whom the children reside, and in allocating the tax benefit to the
parents on the basis of value.

Dr. Bova has not been prejudiced by

the court's ruling.
POINT VI
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO MS.
MELLE IN VIEW OF HER NEED AND DR. BOVA'S
ABILITY TO PAY WAS WARRANTED.
Ms. Melle testified that Dr. Bova vowed when she filed for
divorce that he would rather "give all his money to the attorneys
than give her a cent."

(R. 1960).
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Six attorneys and well over

$24,000 in legal fees later, Dr. Bova should be accustomed to
paying attorneys for legal services rendered.

Nonetheless, he

balks at the trial court's order that he pay $15,000 in legal fees
incurred on behalf of Ms. Melle, claiming he lacks ability to pay
the fees and that inadequate findings were entered regarding Ms.
Melle's need and the reasonableness of the fees.
Dr.

Bova's

payment

of

tens

of

thousands

of

dollars

to

attorneys so far demonstrates his ability to pay Ms. Melle's fees.
The court observed that while he has adequate resources to pay,
Ms. Melle does not:
The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far
in excess of that income earned by Plaintiff. The Court
finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course of
these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his
monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and that in
addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living
expenses. On the other hand, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff's income per month is approximately one quarter
of that earned by Defendant and that all of the
Plaintiff's monthly income is used to pay for necessary
living expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does
not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees after she
has paid her monthly expenses. (R. 1647).
The court further determined that the amount of fees incurred
was

reasonable

unsuccessful

because

motions

Ms.

Melle

filed by

was

Dr. Bova

forced

to

defend

to decrease

his

five
child

support and alimony obligation and was required to file motion to
compel his production of financial records.

(R. 1647).

Obstrep-

erous behavior by the opposing party is another factor that may be
examined in awarding attorney fees.
(Utah App. 1988).

Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365

Considering that Ms. Melle's attorney fees are
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far less than Dr. Bova's, his counsel acted sensibly in failing to
question the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded in the
court below.

He is precluded from questioning the reasonableness

on appeal.
The trial court has broad discretion to award attorney fees
based on need.

Its decision to award her reasonable fees because

she cannot afford to pay them was justified.

Sinclair v. Sinclair,

718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986) (award of attorney fees to wife proper
where record showed evidence of need and reasonableness of fees) .
ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE
INCOME FROM DR. BOVA'S SECOND JOB IN COMPUTING
HIS TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME FOR ALIMONY AND CHILD
SUPPORT PURPOSES.
The trial court relied on Dr. Bova's 1994 W-2 form from the
Spine Center in finding his annual gross income to be $123,869,
or $10,322 per month.

(R. 1638).

His monthly business expenses

are $800 per month, bringing his adjusted gross monthly income to
$9,583.

(R. 1638).

However, he only works twenty six hours per

week at the Spine Center to earn this income.

(R. 2294-95)

It was undisputed at trial that Dr. Bova also began earning
$1,000

per

month

reviewing

files

from

the

Utah

Workers'

Dr. Bova testified at trial that his annual income was
$115,000 before business expenses, and he later maintained that his
income in 1994 from the Spine Center was $109,124.
(R. 1239).
However, the court accurately relied on the 1994 W-2 form in
finding that his income was $125,000.
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Compensation Fund in 1995.

(R. 2299, 2301).

The trial court did

not add this amount to Dr. Bova's income from the Spine Center to
arrive

at

a

total

income

figure

for

purposes

of

calculating

alimony, apparently on the ground that his income "prior to the
filing

of

this

matter"

alone

should

be

considered

considering any additional income earned afterwards.

without

(R. 1638).

This was an error; "the law require [s] that the trial court'
consider [a party's] income from a second job. . . . "
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995).

Breinholt v.

In Breinholt, the court

of appeals reversed a trial court's award of alimony after the
trial court had refused to consider the husband's income from a
second job in calculating alimony on the mistaken belief that since
Utah

statute

allows a court to consider

only

income

from the

equivalent of one full-time job in setting child support, that
restriction must also exist with respect to alimony.

The court of

appeals corrected the trial court's legal error, emphasizing that
it is appropriate and necessary for a trial court to
consider all sources of income that were used by the
parties during their marriage to meet their self-defined
needs, from whatever source -- overtime, second job,
self-employment, etc. . . .
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880, quoting Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d
686 (Utah App. 1994) .
Dr. Bova's income from the Utah Workmen's Compensation Fund
should also have been considered in computing his child support
award.

A party's "gross income" for purposes of calculating child

support is defined as income from earned sources "limited to the
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equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job."
7.5(2).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-

Dr. Bova works twenty six hours per week at the Spine

Center and approximately two hours per week for the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Fund.

These combined amount to less than the equiva-

lent of one full-time 40-hour job.
The alimony and child support awards should be adjusted upward
to reflect Dr. Bova's income from the Utah Workers' Compensation
Fund.

An alimony and child support award should, to the extent

possible, "equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living
standards and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that
standard

of living

enjoyed

Rasband,

752

1331

P.2d

during

(Utah

the marriage."

App.

1988).

The

Rasband
trial

v.

court

acknowledged the disparity in the parties' income levels, noting
that Dr. Bova's income is four times that of Ms. Melle's and that
"all of her monthly income is used to pay for necessary living
expenses."

(R. 1647).

Given this acknowledgment, it is puzzling

that the trial court declined

the opportunity

to equalize the

parties' post-divorce living standards by failing to include a
fixed monthly income from Dr. Bova's second job in fixing alimony.
Remand with instructions to recalculate alimony based on gross
monthly income of $10,583 is warranted in order to achieve the
principle behind spousal support.
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POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED THE TAX
BURDEN OF THE IRA FUNDS IMPROPERLY WITHDRAWN
BY DR. BOVA TO MS. MELLE.
The trial court ordered the parties to file joint 1994 income
tax returns that included the $75,000 IRA withdrawal as income.
The court acknowledged that a "substantial portion'' of the taxes
incurred in 1994 were incurred as a result of Dr. Bova's decision
to violate the court's order and withdraw funds from the IRA.
1642)0

(R.

The court estimated the tax owing by the parties if they

filed jointly to be $16,000 and ordered the parties to bear this
tax burden equally.

(R. 1642-43).

Requiring Ms. Melle to share in a tax burden created solely
due to Dr. Bova's violation of a court order unfairly penalizes her
for his actions.

Dr. Bova should bear all consequences of his

improper

including

actions,

the

tax

consequences.

The

court

imposed this extra tax burden on Ms. Melle during a period of
particular financial hardship, after being required to change her
lifestyle to support herself and two children on her part-time
income, child support and alimony payments, and after expending
several thousand dollars in attorney fees.

Dr. Bova gave Ms. Melle

no say in when the IRA funds were withdrawn and thus had no control
over when she would incur a tax liability for the withdrawal.

In

fact, had the funds been withdrawn several years later, after more
money

had

accumulated

in

the

account

to

the benefit

of

both

parties, it is speculative that she would have been required to pay
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any tax on the withdrawal at all.

Making her now share in the tax

consequences of the withdrawal when she is in a poor financial
situation is unfair.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXTRAPOLATED
BEYOND THE CHILD SUPPORT TABLE TO CALCULATE
CHILD SUPPORT.
The

parties'

combined

monthly

determined by the court to be $11,969.

adjusted

gross

income

was

The highest combined income

listed on the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 is $10,100.

The corresponding

child support amount for two children is $1,400.

The court set

child support at $1,400, as if the parties' combined adjusted gross
monthly income were only $10,100.
The trial court declined to extrapolate beyond the Table and
set child support reflecting the fact that the parties' combined
adjusted gross income is actually $1,869 per month higher, despite
Ms. Melle's urging.

The trial court did not enter any findings

revealing why it declined Ms. Melle's request.

Utah law requires

that in situations such as this, where the combined adjusted gross
income

exceeds

the highest

level

specified

in the Table, "an

appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a
case-by-case basis. . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.12.

The trial

court's failure to follow this edict constitutes error.
Extrapolating beyond the Table to determine child support is
justified in this case.

One of the goals of child support is to

-38-

maintain

the

children

in a standard

possible

to what they enjoyed

during

of

living

as

similar

as

their parents' marriage.

Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).

The parties' minor

children were accustomed during the marriage to participating in
numerous expensive sports activities, including skiing schools and
basketball, that cost almost $300 per month.

Such a unique expense

for children is not accounted for as a monthly expense in the
support figures listed in the Table.

Child support should be

recalculated by using the parents' actual combined adjusted gross
monthly income so the children may maintain these activities.
POINT X
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
UPON NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT DR. BOVA
DISSIPATED MARITAL ASSETS.
Ms.

Melle

learned

for

the

first

time

during

Dr. Bova had set up a trust for his daughter
marriage in the amount of $16,000.

trial

that

from a previous

Ms. Melle had asked Dr. Bova

before trial through written discovery requests to identify all
accounts in his name, but he failed to identify this trust fund in
his responses, despite the fact that he is listed as custodian on
the account.

Dr. Bova testified at trial that he did not deposit

any money in the trust account after the parties separated.
However, a few months after trial, Ms. Melle was cleaning out
the desk Dr. Bova had used at the parties' marital residence and
discovered documents from Strong Discovery Fund suggesting that he
had deposited the bulk of the $16,000 balance after the separation.
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Ms. Melle immediately moved for a new trial in January 1996 on the
basis of this newly-discovered evidence, arguing that the transfer
of funds to his daughter's account after separation constituted an
improper

diversion

of marital

assets.

The

court

issued

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in
September 1996 and later denied Ms. Melle's motion for new trial.
The court's Order simply stated:
It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff's Motion
trial filed January 28, 1996 is denied on the
the Court believes the information upon which
is based was available to Plaintiff through
prior to trial.

for a new
basis that
the Motion
discovery

(R. 1855) .
Since the court offered no explanation for why it believed the
information that Dr. Bova deposited most of the funds into the
account after the parties' separation was available to Ms. Melle
prior to trial, it is difficult to guess the basis for this belief.
The evidence provided by Ms. Melle establishes that she sought
information via pre-trial discovery about the existence of such
accounts, that he failed to reveal the existence of this account
until trial, that he falsely stated at trial he did not deposit any
money into the account after the parties' separation, and that she
"accidentally" found documentation after the trial showing a low
account balance right before the parties' separation.

The trial

court erred in failing to explain its finding that she could have
discovered the diversion of marital monies into the account before
trial.

There is more than ample evidence, on the other hand, to
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support a finding that she could not discover this information
despite due diligence until after trial.
Dr. Bova's transfer of marital monies into his daughter's
trust account after the parties separated was improper.

Ms. Melle

is not requesting that the monies be withdrawn from the fund and
distributed to the parties; rather, she requests that she be given
a credit for half of the monies that were deposited in the account
after separation.

A trial court can consider a party's improper

"gift" of funds to a child in making an equitable distribution of
the parties' remaining assets.
835 (Utah App. 1995).

Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d

Ms. Melle requests that this Court reverse

the trial court's denial of her Motion for New Trial and remand
with instructions to conduct a new trial solely on the issues of
whether marital monies were improperly deposited into the trust
account and how this dissipation will affect the trial court's
property distribution.
POINT XI
MS. MELLE SHOULD BE AWARDED
INCURRED ON APPEAL.

ATTORNEY

FEES

The circumstances regarding Ms. Melle's inability to pay her
attorney fees and Dr. Bova's capacity to cover her attorney fees
have not changed now that this case is on appeal.

"Generally, when

fees in a divorce case are granted to the prevailing party at the
trial court, and that party prevails on appeal, fees will also be
awarded on appeal."

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.
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1991).

Ms. Melle requests that this Court award her reasonable

attorney fees incurred on appeal if she prevails.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Dr. Bova cannot present a compelling reason why the trial
court's

rulings

with

respect

to Ms. Melle's

income,

property

division, the HELC, any capital gains tax on the sale of the
marital residence, tax dependency exemptions, and award of attorney
fees to Ms. Melle constituted an abuse of discretion warranting
this Court's reversal.

Ms. Melle requests that this Court affirm

the trial court's rulings on these issues.
Ms. Melle asks on cross-appeal

that certain of the trial

court's rulings on other issues be modified.

In setting alimony

obligations, the trial court refused to consider income Dr. Bova
earns from a second job in calculating his total monthly income.
Ms. Melle requests that the issue of alimony be remanded with
instructions that the trial court reset alimony after taking into
account income earned from Dr. Bova's second job.

The trial court

also erred in setting child support obligations by failing to
extrapolate from the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table
to calculate child support, and this Court should reverse the award
of child support.
extrapolating

Since the recalculation of child support by

involves the parties' set income figures and the

fixed numbers in the Table, Ms. Melle suggests that the matter of
recalculating child support is within this Court's power (Ms. Melle
has already recalculated child support in footnote 3 of this brief)
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and that remand is not necessary on this issue.

Third, the trial

court

the

committed

error

in

assessing

half

attributable to the IRA withdrawal to her.

of

income

tax

Ms. Melle requests that

Dr. Bova be required to pay the entire tax attributable to the IRA
withdrawal.

Fourth,

the

trial

court

should

have

granted

Ms. Melle's Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence
that Dr. Bova diverted marital assets into his daughter's trust
account.

Ms. Melle asks that this court remand on this issue with

instructions that a trial be conducted solely on this subject.
Finally, Ms. Melle asks that she be awarded reasonable attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this / ^

day of September, 1997.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rodney R. Parker
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM A:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEBORAH A MELLE,

:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs

:

CHARLES M BOVA,

:

Civil No 94-43-00105DA

Defendant

The above entitled matter came on for trial on October 24, 25, and 26, 1995
before the above entitled Court, the Honorable Frank Noel, Judge, presiding Plaintiff was
present and represented by counsel, Evelyn L Saunders Defendant was present and represented
by counsel, Kenneth Okasaki During the trial, the parties reached a stipulation with respect to
the custody of the minor children which stipulation was placed upon the record by the parties As
to the remaining issues, the Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, having heard
testimony presented by the parties, having received exhibits on behalf of the parties and otherwise
being fully informed in the premises took the matter under advisement The Court, at the
conclusion of trial, invited the parties to submit comments to the Court upon receipt of the minute

lU3o

entry in order to address any items the parties felt that the Court may have inadvertently
overlooked or wherein the Court may have made mathematical errors. The Court issued its
decision by Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995. The parties subsequently submitted
comments on the Court's Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995, which comments the Court
took under consideration. The Court additionally heard from the parties at a scheduled hearing
dated April 14, 1996 in response to various motions filed with the Court. A separate order was to
be submitted with respect to said motions. The Court issued a second Minute Entry, dated April
22, 1996 which addressed the comments of the parties that had been submitted to the Court in
written form The Court does now, being fully informed, find as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were residents of Summit County, State of Utah for

the three months immediately preceding the filing of this action. The Court finds it has
jurisdiction in this matter.
2.
28, 1980

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married on June

This is a 16 year marriage.
3.

During the course of the marriage, the Defendant engaged in numerous

extramarital affairs which resulted in a break down of the marriage relationship. The parties
attempted to reconcile their differences and sought counseling; however, the parties were
unsuccessful in salvaging the marriage and Plaintiff filed for divorce. Defendant countersued the
Plaintiff for divorce on the basis on irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that there are
grounds upon which to award the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce based upon her complaint and to
2
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award the Defendant a Decree of Divorce based upon his counterclaim.
4.

There are two children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Mikell Bova,

born March 8, 1984, and Christopher Bova, born May 17, 1987.
5.

During the course of the trial, the parties reached a stipulation regarding

custody of the minor children. The parties stipulated as follows: The parties agreed to joint legal
custody of the minor children; however, all decision making authority regarding the activities of
the children, including, but not limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports
activities, etc. would remain solely with the Plaintiff and she would have the final say with respect
to all issues regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the
parties agreed that since the Plaintiff is a registered nurse and the Defendant is a medical
physician, that the Plaintiff would discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the
Defendant to obtain his input but that the final decision-making authority regarding the children's
medical care and related issues would remain with the Plaintiff. The parties should exchange
information concerning the health, education and welfare of the children.
The Court finds that the parties are unable, by their past interaction, to reach
mutual agreement with respect to the children. Based thereon, the Court finds that the agreement
entered into between the parties is in the best interests of the children and should be adopted by
the Court.
The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would have physical custody of the minor
children and that the Defendant would have visitation with the children.
Based upon the parties' stipulation and the findings as set forth herein, this Court
finds that it is in the best interests of the parties' minor children that the Court adopt the parties'

3
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agreement with respect to the physical custody of the children.
The parties' agreement provides that the Defendant would be entitled to visitation
as follows: The Defendant would have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of
visitation on the alternating week schedule would be from Wednesday after school until Monday
morning when the Defendant would return the children to school The second period of visitation
on the alternating week visitation would be from Thursday after school until Monday morning
when the Defendant returns the children to school
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation would still alternate
weekly as follows: The first period of visitation would commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m.
until Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant would
have the children from Thursday at 1:00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m.
The parties agreed that the Defendant's visitation would not interfere with the
children's pre-scheduled activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when
school is not in session.
The parties agreed that holiday and birthday visitation would be pursuant to U.C.
A. 30-3-35.
The parties agreed that the Defendant would be entitled to have the children for
four weeks of visitation in the summer school vacation period. Further, the Defendant would be
entitled to have the children for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period during his summer
vacation visitation . The Defendant would be required to inform the Plaintiff by May 1 of each
year as to the dates he intends to have the children for his summer visitation periods. The Court
finds that the Defendant's proposed summer visitation should take precedence over the Plaintiffs
4
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summer visitation as the Plaintiff has the children the majority of the time throughout the year.
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for more than 21 days or more, the
Defendant should be entitled to visit with the children on days 15, 16 and 17 or that 21-day
period.
In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14 days or more, the Plaintiff
would be entitled to have the children returned to her for the time period as set forth hereinabove.
The Court finds that the parties' agreement regarding visitation maximizes the amount of
time that the children are able to spend with both parents; that the schedule permits the children to
be transferred from the homes of the respective parties without the parties having to interact with
one another and that given the past history of altercations that have occurred between the parties,
that said visitation schedule will permit visitation to occur with minimal disruption to the
emotional well being of the minor children. Based thereon, the Court finds it in the children's best
interests to adopt the visitation agreement of the parties.
6.

The Plaintiff is a registered nurse who currently is employed on a part-time

basis by Kipp and Christian as a nurse paralegal The Defendant is a physician, board certified in
emergency medicine and certified in sports medicine. The Defendant is currently employed full
time as a physician with the Spine Center. In addition, the Defendant, as an independent
contractor, reviews medical case files for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. In said
capacity, the Defendant works approximately four hours per week and charges $125.00 per hour.
The Court finds that during the course of the marriage, the Plaintiff has always
worked part-time since the birth of the children. Her part-time work schedule was discussed by
the parties and agreed upon by both parties. In addition the Court finds, based upon the
5
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testimony of Dr. Stewart, that it is beneficial to the children's welfare that the Plaintiff not work
full-time so that she can be available to the children when they come home from school. The
Court further believes, that based upon the finances of the parties that the parties can afford this
arrangement.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff works approximately 25 to 30 hours per week
and that she earns an hourly wage of $18.50 which equals a gross salary of $2,386.00 per month
before taxes. The Court calculates the Plaintiffs gross monthly income as follows: $18.50.hr. x
30 hours/wk. x 4.3 weeks/mo.= $2,386.00.
The Court finds the Defendant's gross monthly income to be $9,583.00 before
taxes. The Court reviewed the Defendant's 1993 and 1994 income tax returns and his 1993 and
1994 W-2 tax statements and determined that the Defendant's 1994 income as set forth on his
W-2 form from the Spine Center is the best indicator of the Defendant's income prior to the filing
of this matter. The Court further finds that Defendant's 1994 W-2 reflects his annual gross
income to be $123,869.00 or $10,322.00 per month. The Court further finds that the Defendant
has monthly business expenses which equal approximately $800.00 per month. The Court finds
that after subtracting the Defendant's business expenses that he has an adjusted gross monthly
income of $9,583.00 prior to taxes.
7.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be paid child support by the

Defendant based upon the parties' respective gross monthly incomes as determined hereinabove.
The parties stipulated that irrespective of the amount of days per month that the defendant has the
children for visitation that he would pay child support pursuant to the sole custody worksheet.
The Court adopts the stipulation of the parties with respect to the child support and incorporates
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said agreement herein.
The Court finds that Defendant should be required to pay child support to the
Plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.00 per month, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of the
month and the balance on or before the 20th day of each month. A copy of the child support
obligation worksheet is attached hereto and incorporated by this reference.
8.

The Court finds that pursuant to U.C. A. §78-45-7.16 that the Defendant

should pay one-half of the Plaintiffs actual work-incurred day care costs and that it should be
paid on or before the 1st day of each month.
9.

The Court finds that the Defendant has expenses equal to $8,145.00 which

includes his obligation for child support, insurance and taxes as follows:
Rent and Insurance
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Laundry and Cleaning
Clothing
Life Insurance
Child support(approximate)
Entertainment
Incidentals
Auto payments
Auto Expenses
Installments
Medical/Dental
Taxes
Medical Insurance
Total

$

$

1,000.00
400.00
175.00
75.00
50.00
150.00
407.00
1,400.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
120.00
200.00
150.00
3,000.00
150.00
8,045.00

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs net monthly income, after taxes and mandatory
withholding is $1,800.00. The Court deducted 25% for taxes from her gross monthly pay to
determine her net monthly pay. The Court has also taken into consideration that the Plaintiff will

Iti8u

receive child support as set forth hereinabove. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs monthly
expenses are as follows:
Mortgage
Property Taxes
Property Insurance
Residence Maintenance
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities
Telephone
Laundry and cleaning
Clothing
Health Insurance
Dental
Entertainment
Incidentals
Auto payments
Auto Expenses
Children's Sports programs and equipment
Taxes on alimony
Installments
Total

$ 1,000.00
200.00
100.00
200.00
500.00
250.00
100.00
50.00
200.00
400.00
50.00
250.00
150.00
350.00
220.00
200.00
200.00
175.00
$4,595.00

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a need for alimony and that the Defendant has
the ability to pay alimony to her. Based thereon, the Court finds that the Defendant should be
obligated to pay the sum of $1,200.00 per month to the Plaintiff as alimony. The Court finds that
the Defendant is paid once a month, usually by the 5th day of each month. Based thereon, the
Court finds that alimony should be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of each month.
Alimony payable to the Plaintiff should terminate upon the Plaintiffs cohabitation with a person
of the opposite gender, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of the Divorce Decree
herein, whichever event occurs first.
10.

The Court finds that the Defendant has a life insurance policy in effect. In

determining the Defendant's monthly expenses hereinabove, the Court has computed the monthly
8
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expenses associated with said life insurance policy. The Court finds it reasonable that the
Defendant should be required to continue to pay for and maintain said a life insurance policy in an
amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children with the Plaintiff as trustee of
any proceeds. The Defendant should be required to provide proof of said insurance and
designation of beneficiaries thereunder to the Plaintiff on or before January 5 of each year.
11.

The parties acquired a marital residence located at 7752 Boothill Drive,

Park City, Utah. Although title of said real property is held in the name of the Defendant, the
Court finds that it is a marital asset in which the parties each owns 50%, respectively, of the
equity therein. The parties had a real property appraisal conducted and, based thereon, the parties
stipulated that the value of said real property was $385,000.00. The parties fiirther stipulated that
the first mortgage against said real property equals approximately $176,165.00. The parties also
have a line of credit secured by said real property which had a balance of approximately
$24,000.00 at time of trial. At the time the parties separated in August, 1994, the line of credit
had a balance of approximately $18,000.00. The Court finds that approximately $18,000.00 of
the line of credit was used by the Defendant for his own purposes such as attorney's fees and the
purchase of Sea Doo water crafts for which he should be responsible, particularly in light of the
fact that the Court is awarding the Defendant the full value of the Sea Doos without being
charged against him as marital property as set forth hereinbelow. The Court also finds that the
balance of the line of credit was incurred by the Defendant to pay his temporary Court ordered
alimony obligations to the Plaintiff and Court ordered mortgage payments. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Defendant should be required to pay the entire balance of the home equity
line of credit.
9
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Commencing December 15, 1995, until the marital home is either refinanced by the
Plaintiff in her own name or the home is sold, the mortgage is to be paid by the Defendant and he
should be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the monthly mortgage
payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth hereinabove. The
Defendant should be required to pay the monthly indebtedness associated with the line of credit
until such time as Plaintiff refinances the residence or the residence is sold.
12.

The Court finds that the parties should be required to file joint 1994

income tax returns since the parties resided together for a substantial portion of 1994. The Court
further finds that a substantial portion of the taxes incurred in 1994 was incurred as a result of the
Defendant withdrawing $75,000.00 from the parties' IRA and the Court is going to give the
Plaintiff one half of the amount withdrawn as set forth hereinbelow. The Court finds that the
parties will save money on federal and state taxes if they are required to file jointly for tax year
1994. The Court finds that the taxes owing by the parties if they file jointly will be approximately
$16,000.00 and, further, that a tax penalty of $7,500.00 will be assessed against the parties for
the early withdrawal of the $75,000 00 from the parties' IRA in 1994.
The Court finds that from the $75,000.00 withdrawn by the Defendant from the
IRA that there was a previous Court order permitting the Defendant to withdraw $6,000 00 for
the parties' attorney's fees, $3,000.00 for fees to Dr. Elizabeth Stewart and $3,900.00 for family
medical bills which amounts total $12,900.00. It is equitable that the parties should be required to
bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00 assessed on said amount which equals 645.00
respectively. The Court finds that the withdrawal by the Defendant of the remaining $62,100.00
from the IRA was improper and that he should be required to pay the penalty associated therewith
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in the approximate sum of $6,210 00.
The Court finds that there is sufficient equity in the marital home to pay said taxes
if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home and, if the home is sold, that the taxes should be paid from
the net proceeds The amounts owing as taxes for 1994 should be held in an escrow account and
any amount not used to pay taxes should be divided equally between the parties The tax penalty
of $7,500 00 should remain in the escrow account until paid
There are outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family
Affairs in the sum of $750 00, andDr Stewart in the sum of $2,069 40 Said debts plus interest
thereon and any carrying charges incurred until paid should be paid from the sales proceeds of the
home, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home The net proceeds after payment of said debts
should be divided equally between the parties subject to certain offsets as set forth in paragraph
12 hereinabove
13

The Court ordered on April 18, 1996 that the Plaintiff has the option of

refinancing the marital residence and keeping the marital residence The Court further found that
if the Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital residence that she should be required to refinance the
residence in her own name and bear the costs of refinancing No deductions should be allowed
for realtor fees if the Plaintiff refinances the residence To determine the Defendant's equity in the
marital residence, the mortgage of $176,165 00 should be deducted from the appraised value of
$385,000 00 and the balance should be divided in half From the Defendant's share of the equity,
the following amounts should be deducted the $29,597 00 awarded to the Plaintiff as her one half
of the $75,000 00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant ($36,047 00 previously ordered less
one half of the $12,900 00 representing the portion of the $75,000 00 the Court allowed to be
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withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties); Plaintiffs attorney's fees equal to
$15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set forth hereinabove; plus all of the
$7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum of $645.00.
14.

The parties have divided their personal possessions between them except

for the items addressed herein. The personal property in each party's possession was appraised by
Family Affairs. The value of the personal property in the Plaintiffs possession is equal to
$14,636.00 and the value of the personal property in the Defendant's possession equals
$11,050.00. The parties stipulated to the appraised value and further stipulated that each party
would be awarded those items in their respective possession. The Court adopts the parties'
stipulation regarding the personal property distribution except for the following: the Defendant
should deliver to Plaintiff the camera case, lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in
her possession and she should be awarded the same; the Plaintiff should be awarded the Gorman
lithograph; and the Plaintiff should deliver to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated
with the Sea Doos, including the surfboard, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he should be
awarded.
The Court finds it equitable to award the Sea Doo water crafts to the Defendant as
the Court has required the Defendant to pay the line of credit which was used to purchase the Sea
Doos.
The parties stipulated to the values of the vehicles in their possession. The value
of the Plaintiffs vehicle, after deductions for amounts owing thereon, equals $1,795.00. The
value of the Defendant's vehicle, after deductions for amounts owing thereon, is $2,825.00.
The Court awards the Defendant the following marital assets:
12
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Household Items
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos)
1992 Subaru SVX
Zions Checking Account
Zions Money Market Account
IRA Withdrawal

$ 11,050.00
$ 2,825.00
$
250.00
$
600.00
$ 75,000.00

Total

$ 89,725.00
The Court awards the Plaintiff the following marital assets:

Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00
1994 Subaru
$ 1,795.00
Feb. '95 IRA distributions
$ 1,200.00

Total

$ 17,631.00
The difference between the amounts awarded to the respective parties is

$72,094.00 which when divided in half is equal to $36,047.00. The Court finds that the
Defendant owes to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00 (as set forth in paragraph 13 hereinabove)
which will compensate the Plaintiff for the difference in the personal property award. Said
amount will be deducted from the Defendant's share of the equity in the marital residence and will
reimburse the Plaintiff for the difference in the values of the personal property awarded.
15.

The paries acquired the following retirement accounts and brokerage

accounts: Prudential Securities valued at approximately $116,593.98; Brandywine valued at
approximately $88,000.00; the Fidelity account valued at approximately $57,018.00 ; the Strong
account valued at approximately $8,504.00, and the Mass Mutual account at $7,878.36. The
approximate value of said accounts equals $277,994.34. The Court finds that said items are
marital assets; that the values will fluctuate due to interest changes and asset values; however, the
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Court finds that each party should be awarded one half of the value of said accounts as each
account is valued at such time as the Decree of Divorce is entered herein.
16.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff presently carries health insurance which

provides coverage for the parties' minor children. The Court finds that if the Defendant can
obtain comparable coverage as that insurance carried by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he should able
to do so and each party should share equally the out of pocket costs of the premium actually paid
by the parent for the children's portion of the insurance. The children's portion of the premium
should be a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children
should be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children herein and dividing that portion
attributable to the children by one-half The Court finds that the provisions as set forth in UCA
78-45-7.15 should apply herein and said provisions should be incorporated herein by this
reference Each party should share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical
expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor children. If one of the
parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said party should be required to
provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other party within thirty days of
payment.
17.

The Court finds that the tax exemptions for the minor children should be

awarded to the Plaintiff; however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax
advantage by claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, it is reasonable that the
Defendant should be entitled to "purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The Defendant
may purchase the tax exemptions by paying the Plaintiff that amount she would save on her taxes
by claiming the children.
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18.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff knew of the trust accounts held in the

children's names, including the trust for Melissa Bova. The Court finds that said amounts in trust
should not be returned as marital assets, but should remain as trusts for the benefit of the children
as now established.
19.

The Court finds that the income of the Defendant is far in excess of that

income earned by the Plaintiff. The Court finds that the Defendant had, throughout the course of
these divorce proceedings, adequate funds from his monthly salary to pay his attorney's fees and
that in addition, he had enough funds to pay for his living expenses. On the other hand, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs income per month is approximately one quarter of that earned by the
Defendant and that all of the Plaintiffs monthly income is used to pay for necessary living
expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees
after she has paid her monthly expenses. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's
fees in this matter with a balance owing thereon, prior to trial, of $15,036.00 and that she has
incurred additional attorney's fees and costs for three day of trial; that the attorney's fees and
costs incurred by the Plaintiff were reasonable and necessary in order to represent her; that the
Plaintiff was forced to incur fees in opposing five motions made by the Defendant to lower his
child support and/or alimony obligations which motions were denied each time by the Court; and
that the Plaintiff was forced to incur attorney's fees and costs in filing motions to compel to
obtain information regarding the Defendant's financial records. The Court finds that the Plaintiff
has a need for attorney's fees; that the Defendant has a greater ability to earn income than the
Plaintiff; that the Defendant has the ability to pay for the Plaintiffs attorney fees; and the Court
awards the Plaintiff $15,000.00 in attorney's fees.
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20.

Each party has certain post separation debts which should be assumed and

paid by the party incurring the debt. The debt to Donna Melle incurred by the Plaintiff is not a
marital debt and the Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay said debt. The debt to Jane
Bova is not a marital debt and the Defendant should be required to assume and pay said debt.
21.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial which the Court will address after

judgment in this matter has been entered.
22.

The parties should be required to execute any and all necessary documents

to effectuate the terms set forth herein.

The Court having heretofore entered it Findings of Fact does now enter its
Conclusions of Law as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction herein to grant the Plaintiff and the Defendant a

Decree of Divorce with the same to become final upon entry.
2.

Each party should be awarded a Decree of Divorce against the other with

the same to become final upon entry.
3.

The parties should be awarded joint legal custody of the minor children;

however, all decision-making authority regarding the activities of the children, including, but not
limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports activities, etc. should remain
solely with the Plaintiff and she should have final decision authority with respect to all issues
regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the Plaintiff should
discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the Defendant to obtain his input but the
16
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final decision-making authority regarding the children's medical care and related issues should
remain with the Plaintiff. The parties should be required to exchange information concerning the
health, education and welfare of the children.
The Plaintiff should have physical custody of the minor children and the Defendant
should have visitation with the children.
The Defendant should be entitled to visitation as follows: The Defendant should
have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of visitation on the alternating week
schedule should be from Wednesday after school until Monday morning when the Defendant
should return the children to school. The second period of visitation on the alternating week
visitation should be from Thursday after school until Monday morning when the Defendant
returns the children to school.
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation should still alternate
weekly as follows: The first period of visitation should commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m.
until Monday morning at 8:00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant should
have the children from Thursday at 1.00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m.
The Defendant's visitation should not interfere with the children's pre-scheduled
activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when school is not in session.
The parties' holiday and birthday visitation should be pursuant to U.C. A. 30-3-35.
The Defendant should be entitled to have the children for four weeks of visitation
in the summer school vacation period wherein the Defendant should be entitled to have the
children for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period as a portion of his summer visitation .
The Defendant should be required to inform the other by May 1 of each year as to the dates he
17
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intends to have the children for the summer visitation periods. Defendant's summer visitation
should have precedence over Plaintiffs summer visitation.
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for a period of 21 days or
more, the Defendant should be entitled to exercise his regular visitation on days 15, 16 & 17 of
that 21-day period. In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14 days or more,
the Plaintiff should be entitled to have the children returned to her for the time period as set forth
hereinabove.
4.

Defendant should pay child support to Plaintiff in the sum of $1,400.00 per

month, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of the month and the balance on or before the
20th day of each month. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the child support should be
based upon the sole custody worksheet irrespective of the amount of days per month that the
Defendant has the children for visitation.
5.

The Defendant should pay one-half of Plaintiff s actual work-incurred day

care costs and payment should be made on or before the 1st day of each month.
6.

The Defendant should be obligated to pay the sum of $1,200.00 per month

to the Plaintiff as alimony. Alimony should be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of
each month. Alimony payable to the Plaintiff should terminate at such time upon the Plaintiffs
cohabitation with a person of the opposite gender, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of
the Divorce Decree herein, whichever event occurs first.
7.

The Defendant should be required to continue to pay for and maintain his

life insurance policy in an amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children
with the Plaintiff as trustee of any proceeds. The Defendant should be required to provide proof
18
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of insurance or before the 5th day of January of each year.
8.

|

The Plaintiff should be awarded the marital residence, at her option or it

may be sold. If the Plaintiff opts to keep the marital residence, the equity therein should be
divided equally between the parties and the Defendant awarded one half of the equity subject to
certain offsets as set forth herein. If the home is sold, the net sales proceeds after payment of the
sales costs and the first mortgage should be divided equally between the parties with the
Defendant's one half of the equity subject to certain offsets as set forth herein.
Commencing December 15, 1995, until the marital home is either refinanced by the
Plaintiff in her own name or the home is sold, the mortgage should be paid by the Defendant and
he should be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the monthly mortgage
payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth hereinabove.
The Defendant should be required to assume and pay the monthly indebtedness
associated with the line of credit until the residence is sold or Plaintiff refinances the residence.
9.

The parties should file joint 1994 income tax returns. The parties should

be required to bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00 assessed on the early
withdrawal of the IRA which amount equals $645.00 respectively. The Defendant should be
required to pay the balance of the penalty associated with the early withdrawal in the
approximate sum of $6,210.00.
The 1994 taxes should be paid equally from the sales proceeds of the marital
residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the home. The amounts owing as taxes for 1994 should
be held in an escrow account and any amount not used to pay taxes should be divided equally
between the parties. The tax penalty of $7,500.00 should remain in the escrow account until paid.
19

The outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family Affairs, in
the sum of $750.00 and Dr. Stewart in the sum of $2,069.40 including interest and carrying costs
thereon until paid in full, should be paid from the sales proceeds of the home, if the Plaintiff
chooses to sell the home. If the Plaintiff elects to keep the marital residence, said amounts should
be charged against each party's share of the equity in the marital residence.
10.

If the Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital home, she should be required to

refinance the home in her own name and bear the costs of refinancing. No deductions should be
allowed for realtor fees if the Plaintiff refinances the home. To determine the Defendant's equity
in the marital residence, the mortgage of $176,165.00 should be deducted from the appraised
value of $385,000.00 and the balance should be divided in half. From the Defendant's share of
the equity, the following amounts should be deducted: the $29,597.00 awarded to the Plaintiff as
her one half of the $75,000.00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant ($36,047.00 previously
ordered less one half of the $12,900.00 representing the portion of the $75,000.00 the Court
allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties); Plaintiffs attorney's
fees equal to $15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set forth hereinabove; plus
all of the $7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum of $645.00 and one half
of the outstanding amounts owed to Family Affairs, real property appraiser and Dr. Stewart.
11.

Each party should be awarded those items of personal property in their

respective possession. In addition, the Defendant should deliver to Plaintiff the camera case,
lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in her possession and she should be awarded
the same; the Plaintiff should be awarded the Gorman lithograph; and the Plaintiff should deliver
to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated with the Sea Doos, including the surf

20

JL \J J i <*

board, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he should be awarded.
The Defendant should be awarded the Sea Doo water crafts.
The Defendant should be awarded the following marital assets:
Household Items
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos)
1992 Subaru SVX
Zions Checking Account
Zions Money Market Account
IRA Withdrawal

$ 11,050.00
$ 2,825.00
$
250.00
$
600.00
$ 75,000.00

Total

$ 89,725.00
The Plaintiff should be awarded the following marital assets:

Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00
1994 Subaru
$ 1,795.00
Feb. '95 IRA distributions
$ 1,200.00

Total

$ 17,631.00
Due to the disparity in the values awarded to each party, the Defendant should be

required to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00 which will compensate the Plaintiff for the
difference in the personal property award. Said amount should be deducted from the Defendant's
share of the equity in the marital residence.
12.

The following retirement accounts and brokerage accounts: Prudential

Securities, Brandywine, the Fidelity account, the Strong account and the Mass Mutual account
valued as of the date of trial plus any increases accruing thereon should be awarded equally to the
parties.
13.

The Plaintiff should be required to maintain her nresent health insurance
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which provides coverage for the parties' minor children, so long as it is available to her through
her employment at a reasonable cost. If the Defendant can obtain comparable coverage as that
insurance carried by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he should able to do so and each party should share
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by the parent for the children's
portion of the insurance. The children's portion of the premium should be a per capita share of
the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children should be calculated by dividing
the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result
by the number of children herein and dividing that portion attributable to the children by one-half
The provisions as set forth in UCA 78-45-7.15 should apply herein and said provisions should be
incorporated herein by this reference. Each party should share equally all reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the
minor children If one of the parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said
party should be required to provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other
party within thirty days of payment.
14.

The tax exemptions for the minor children should be awarded to the

Plaintiff; however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax advantage by
claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, the Defendant should be entitled to
"purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The purchase price should be the difference
between the taxes paid by the Plaintiff using the exemption and the taxes paid by her if she does
not use the exemption.
15.

The trust accounts held in the children's names, including the trust for

Melissa Bova, should remain as trusts for the benefit of the children as now established.
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16.

The Defendant should be required to pay the Plaintiff $15,000.00 for the

use of her attorney in this matter with said amount to be offset against the marital residence as set
forth hereinabove.
17.

The Plaintiff should be required to assume and her pay her post separation

debts incurred in her own name and the debt to her mother, Donna Melle. The Defendant should
be required to assume and pay his post separation debts and the debt to his mother, Jane Bova.
18.

The Court should address Plaintiffs a motion for a new trial after

judgment in this matter has been entered.
19.

The parties should be required to execute any and all necessary documents

et forth hprein.
herein.
to effectuate the terms set
DATED:

BY THE COURT:

%°*%,n t t J^$4*- Noel
\^'»

W c t Court Judge

""I'umm^

Approval As to Form:

Kenneth Okazaki
Attorney for Defendant
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, KENNETH OKAZAKI:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by
the Plaintiff shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5)
days from the date of the service of this notice.
DATED this

V

day of September, 1996.
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS

EvelynL. Saunders,
Attojarey for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document this -^

day of September, 1996 to the following:

Kenneth Okazaki
City Centre I
Suite 900
178 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

uv
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ADDENDUM B:
DECREE OF DIVORCE

HG,

Evelyn L Saunders #2864

*-

SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS

P

! I C li

SUMMIT COUNTY

Attorney for Plaintiff
401 Main Street
P O Box 3418
Park City, Utah 84060
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B
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(801)649-7496
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAHl

DEBORAH A MELLE,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

CHARLES M BOVA,
Defendant

:

Civil No 94-43-00105DA

*

Judge Frank G Noel

The above entitled matter came on for trial on October 24, 25, and 26, 1995
before the above entitled Court, the Honorable Frank G Noel, District Judge, presiding Plaintiff
was present and represented by counsel, Evelyn L Saunders Defendant was present and
represented by counsel, Kenneth Okasaki During the trial, the parties reached a stipulation with
respect to the custody of the minor children which stipulation was placed upon the record by the
parties As to the remaining issues, the Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file herein,
having heard testimony presented by the parties, having received exhibits on behalf of the parties
and otherwise being fully informed in the premises took the matter under advisement The Court,
at the conclusion of trial, invited the parties to submit comments to the Court upon receipt of the

minute entry in order to address any items the parties felt that the Court may have inadvertently
overlooked or wherein the Court may have made mathematical errors. The Court issued its
decision by Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995. The parties subsequently submitted
comments on the Court's Minute Entry, dated December 14, 1995, which comments the court
took under consideration. The court additionally heard from the parties at a scheduled hearing
dated April 14, 1996 in response to various motions filed with the Court. A separate order was to
be submitted with respect to said motions. The court issued a second Minute Entry, dated April
22, 1996 which addressed the comments of the parties that had been submitted to the Court in
written form. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
does now order as follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

Decree of Divorce:

Plaintiff and Defendant are both awarded a Decree of

Divorce against the other, severing the bonds of matrimony, with the same to become final upon
entry.
2.

Custody and Visitation:

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the

minor children; however, all decision making authority regarding the activities of the children,
including, but not limited to, medical issues, schooling, social activities, and sports activities, etc.
shall remain solely with the Plaintiff and she shall have final decision authority with respect to all
issues regarding the children. With respect to medical issues regarding the children, the Plaintiff
shall discuss any medical issues regarding the children with the Defendant to obtain his input but
the final decision making authority regarding the children's medical care and related issues shall
remain with the Plaintiff. The parties shall exchange information concerning the health, education
2
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and welfare of the children.
The Plaintiff shall have physical custody of the minor children and the Defendant
shall have visitation with the children as follows:
The Defendant shall have visitation in alternating weeks. The first period of
visitation on the alternating week schedule shall be from Wednesday after school until Monday
morning when the Defendant shall return the children to school. The second period of visitation
on the alternating week visitation shall be from Thursday after school until Monday morning when
the Defendant shall return the children to school.
When school is not in session, the Defendant's visitation shall alternate weekly as
follows: The first period of visitation shall commence on Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. until Monday
morning at 8.00 a.m. During the second period of visitation, the Defendant shall have the
children from Thursday at 1:00 p.m. to Monday morning at 8:00 a.m.
The Defendant's visitation shall not interfere with the children's pre-scheduled
activities which take place on Wednesdays and Thursdays or when school is not in session.
The parties' holiday and birthday visitation shall be pursuant to U.C. A. §30-3-35.
The Defendant shall be entitled to have the children for four weeks of visitation in
the summer school vacation period wherein the Defendant shall be entitled to have the children
for a two week consecutive, uninterrupted period as a portion of his summer visitation . The
Defendant shall inform the Plaintiff by May 1 of each year as to the dates he intends to have the
children for the summer visitation periods. Defendant's summer visitation schedule shall have
precedence over the Plaintiffs summer visitation schedule.
In the event the Plaintiff has the children in her care for a period of 21 consecutive

3
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days or more, the Defendant shall be entitled to exercise his regular visitation on days 15, 16 and
17 of said 21-day period In the event the Defendant has the children for a period of 14
consecutive days or more, the Plaintiff shall be entitled to have the children returned to her for the
time period as set forth hereinabove.
3. Child Support:

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of

$1,400.00 per month as child support, payable one-half on or before the 5th day of each month
and the balance on or before the 20th day of each month.
4. Child Care Costs:

Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.16, Defendant shall

pay to Plaintiff one-half of her work-incurred day care costs. Payment shall be due on or before
the 1st day of each month.
5. Alimony: The Defendant shall pay alimony to the Plaintiff in the sum of
$1,200.00 per month Said alimony shall be paid to the Plaintiff on or before the 10th day of each
month. Alimony payable to the Plaintiff shall terminate upon the Plaintiffs cohabitation with a
person of the opposite sex, remarriage, death, or 192 months after entry of the Divorce Decree
herein, whichever event occurs first.
6. Life Insurance:

The Defendant shall pay for and maintain his existing life

insurance policy in an amount of $100,000.00 for the benefit of the parties' minor children with
the Plaintiff named as trustee of any proceeds. The Defendant shall provide proof of insurance
and beneficiary designation on or before the 5th day of January of each year.
7. Marital Residence:

The Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence, at her

option, or if she does not opt to keep the residence, said residence shall be sold. If the Plaintiff
opts to keep the marital residence, the equity therein of $208,835.00 shall be divided equally
4
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between the parties and the Defendant shall be awarded one half of the equity subject to certain
offsets as set forth herein. If said residence is sold, the net sales proceeds after payment of the
sales costs and the first mortgage shall be divided equally between the parties, provided however,
the Defendant's share of the equity shall be subject to certain offsets as set forth herein.
Commencing December 15, 1995, until said residence is either refinanced by the
Plaintiff in her own name or the residence is sold, the first mortgage shall be paid by the
Defendant and he shall be entitled to a credit of $1,789.00, representing the amount of the
monthly mortgage payment, against his alimony and child support obligation as set forth
hereinabove. Defendant shall assume and pay the monthly payment associated with the line of
credit until the Plaintiff refinances the residence or the property is sold.
8. 1994 Income Tax Returns:

The parties shallfilejoint 1994 federal and
I
state income tax returns. The parties shall bear equally the penalty of approximately $1,290.00
assessed on the early withdrawal of the Defendant's IRA which amount equals $645.00,
respectively. The Defendant shall pay the balance of the penalty associated with the early
withdrawal in the approximate sum of $6,210.00.
The 1994 taxes shall be paid equally from each party's share of the sales proceeds
I
of the marital residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the same. The amounts owing as taxes for
1994 shall be held in an escrow account and any amount not used to pay taxes shall, subject to the
offsets described herein, be divided equally between the parties. The tax penalty of $7,500.00
shall remain in the escrow account until paid.
The outstanding debts owed to the personal property appraiser, Family Affairs in
the sum of $750 00 and Dr Elizabeth Stewart in the sum of $2, 069.40 plus interest thereon and
5
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any carrying costs which accrued until paid in full, shall be paid from the sale proceeds of the
marital residence, if the Plaintiff chooses to sell the same. If the Plaintiff elects to keep the
marital residence, said amounts shall be charged against each party's share of the equity in the
marital residence.
9. Offsets Against Defendant's Equity in Marital Residence:

If the Plaintiff

chooses to keep the marital residence, she shall be required to refinance the home in her own
name and bear the costs of refinancing. No deductions shall be allowed for realtor fees if the
Plaintiff refinances the home. To determine the Defendant's equity in the marital residence, if the
Plaintiff chooses to keep the marital residence, the stipulated amount $176,165.00 shall be
deducted from the appraised value of $385,000.00 and the balance shall be divided in half. From
the Defendant's share of the equity, the following amounts shall be deducted: the $29,597.00
awarded to the Plaintiff as her one half of the $75,000.00 IRA funds withdrawn by the Defendant
($36,047.00 previously ordered less one half of the $12,900.00 representing the portion of the
$75,000.00 the Court allowed to be withdrawn from the IRS and which benefited both parties);
Plaintiffs attorney's fees equal to $15,000.00; the Defendant's share of the 1994 taxes as set
forth hereinabove; plus all of the $7,500.00 penalty less Plaintiffs share of the penalty in the sum
of $645.00 and one half of the outstanding amounts owed to Family Affairs and Dr. Elizabeth
Stewart.
10. Personal Property:

Each party shall be awarded those items of personal

property in their respective possession. In addition, the Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff the
camera case, lenses and accessories which are part of the camera in her possession and she shall
be awarded the same; the Plaintiff is awarded the Gorman lithograph; and the Plaintiff shall
6
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deliver to the Defendant the water sports equipment associated with the Sea Doos, including the
surfboard, wet suits, life jackets, ropes, etc. which he is awarded.
The Defendant is awarded the Sea Doo water crafts.
The Defendant is awarded the following marital assets:
Household Items
( deducting $7,500.00 for the Sea Doos)
1992 Subaru SVX
Zions Checking Account
Zions Money Market Account
IRA Withdrawal

$ 11,050.00
$ 2,825.00
$
250.00
$
600.00
$ 75,000.00

Total

$ 89,725.00
The Plaintiff is awarded the following marital assets:

Household Items(includes the Gorman litho) $ 14,636.00
1994 Subaru
$ 1,795.00
Feb. '95 IRA distributions
$ 1,200.00
Total

$ 17,631.00

Due to the disparity in the values awarded to each party, the Defendant shall pay
to the Plaintiff the sum of $29,597.00, as set forth in paragraph 9 hereinabove, which will
compensate the Plaintiff for the difference in the personal property award. Said amount shall be
deducted from the Defendant's share of the equity in the marital residence.
11. Brokerage and Retirement Accounts: The following retirement accounts
and brokerage accounts: Prudential Securities, Brandywine, Fidelity, Strong and the Mass
Mutual account valued as of the date of trial, plus any increases accruing thereon, should be
awarded equally to the parties.
12.

The Plaintiff shall maintain her present health insurance which provides
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coverage for the parties5 minor children, so long as it is available to her through her employment
at a reasonable cost. If the Defendant can obtain comparable coverage as that insurance carried
by Plaintiff, at a lower cost, he shall be permitted to do so. Each party shall share equally the outof-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by the parent for the children's portion of the
insurance. The children's portion of the premium shall be a per capita share of the premium
actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium
amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the
number of children herein and dividing the portion attributable to the children by one-half. The
provisions as set forth in UCA§ 78-45-7.15 shall apply herein and said provisions are
incorporated herein by this reference. Each party shall share equally all reasonable and necessary
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the minor
children If one of the parties incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children, said party
shall be required to provide written notification of the costs and payments to the other party
within thirty days of payment.
13. Tax Exemptions:

The tax exemptions for the minor children shall be

awarded to the Plaintiff, however, if it should appear that the Defendant may gain a greater tax
advantage by claiming the children as exemptions on his tax returns, the Defendant shall be
entitled to "purchase" the tax exemptions from the Plaintiff. The purchase price shall be the
difference in taxes owing if the Plaintiff uses the exemptions and that amount of taxes owing if she
does not use the exemption.
14. Children's Trust Accounts:

The trust accounts held in the children's

names, including the trust for Melissa Bova, shall remain as trusts for the benefit of the children as
8
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now established.
15. Attorney's Fees and Costs:

The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff

$15,000.00 for the use of her attorney in this matter with said amount to be offset against the
Defendant's equity in marital residence as hereinabove set forth.
16. Debts and Obligations: The Plaintiff shall assume and pay her post
separation debts incurred in her own name and the debt to Donna Melle. The Defendant shall
assume and pay his post separation debts and the debt to his mother, Janie Bova.
17. Execution of Documents:

The paries shall execute any and all

necessary documents
aments to
to effectuate
effectuate the
the terms
terms set
set forth
rorth herein.
herein.

«»!>»"»'»,,BY THE COURT:

MSttJK
Approval As to Form:

Kenneth Okazaki
Attorney for Defendant
c:docs\Melle\dd
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 4-504 OF THE RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TO THE DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, KENNETH OKAZAKI:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial
Administration of the District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by
the Plaintiff shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an objection in writing within five (5)
days from the date of the service of this notice.
DATED this

^> day of September, 1996.
SAUNDERS & SAUNDERS

<~)

JEvelynlT. Saunders,
[ Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that, on this

day of September, 1996,1 caused to be mailed, first

class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
Ken Okazaki, Esq.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
178 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE _Third_

DISTRICT COURT

Summit

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

Debbie Melle_
vs.

Civil No.

94-43-00105 DA

Charles Bova

MOTHER

FATHER

1. Enter the # of natural and adopted
children of this mother and father for whom
support is to be awarded.

II/III//

mum
mi

///////
///////

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross
monthly income. Refer to Instructions for
definition of income.

$2,386

$9,583

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is
actually paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered
for this case).

—

—

2c. Enter previously ordered child support.
(Do not enter obligations ordered for the
children in Line 1) .

—

_

2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12
of the children in Present Home Worksheet for
either parent.

—

—

3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c and 2d from 2a. This
is the Adjusted Gross Income for child
support purposes.

$2,386

4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the
number of children in Line 1 to the Support
Table. Find the Combined Support Obligation.
Enter it here.

///III//
///////
III 11 III Ill/Ill
///III//
///////
IIIIII
IIIIII

( ) Mother

I H h«»

1

///mil
ii m ill
m'ii ill
in
/////i/\
II

inn ii\
mi m\
n
in ii in
in in ill
II

$9,583

20%

80%

$11,969
*
$1,400
**

11 III III
mi nil
II

$

$1,400

"

in m i\
mi nil
ii

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in
Line 6 for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from
the Low Income Table.
Which parent is the obligor?

~2

inn ill

5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly
gross in Line 2a by the COMBINED adjusted
monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent
to obtain the parent's share of the Base
1 Support Obligation.

mi

COMBINE
D

$1,400

(X) Father

\
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summit county
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Utaft DR3/ORS

Universal Income vitw>olding

IN THE

T H i rxJL
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IN AND FOR
bgtSoTZ./=\H

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSAL INCOME WITHHOLDING
INFORMATION

WEVte

Plaintiff,

^ 4 : H B - OCM O g

Civil No.
Judge

Defendant.

Frolic

£> .

I 2 - STATE

[l 1 . PLAIKTIFT'S KAXLXKC ADDRESS

i
1

11 4 . SOCIAL SECURITY KUHBER

B. TELEPHONE HUKfiER

II 9 . EMPLOYER ADDRESS

t"7 3

e:

1 3* ZIP

UT

6 . TELEPttDKE KIMSER

S- DATE OF BIRTH

jl 7* EMPLOrER KAHE

||_

NoJ

S

* > 3 3 o - ""

" 5*uT

0<MdG

CilY

1 3 . STATE
U T

If 1 2 , DETEKDAWT'S KAJLIRC ADDRESS
jj I S - SOCIAL SECURIT* NUMBER

II 18. EMPLOYER HAWE
5PIME
(^e^^OL

! 11* ZIP
^mi t

1 0 . STATE

-

Moo

1 6 . DACE OF BIRTH

U.

ZIP

22.

ZIP

1 7 . TELEPHONE NIKBER
1 9 . TZLZPEQhT lftJHBER

<£-

PtorJteHT^

V A L L O f ' WotS€>.

Ij 2 0 , EMPLOYER ADDRESS

j 2 1 . STAT?

u~r

1

:
If 2 3 , CHILDREN BORK Of THIS WARRIACE
|

./

NAME

1 * fAitf-euu

,"
'•"

B&VA

_ "7,
•"

*•

DATE OF BIRTH

SOCIAL S2GTRTTT IfUKBER

:

3-15--54

5 ^ 5 - S I - k'|5<*

1 -•

5 - n -

5 X 5 - ^ 1 - -7C7?

B.

II

Cs

|

D.

|

£

,
'

'

. *
4

'•'

•

F.
- ^ — , — * " rr-*m—mwmmm—i—

NOTE:

. — . —

.,

If address of the obligor (person owing support) is unknown you must check
the appropriate box below and attach the appropriate affidavitsIf the obligor (person owing support) is unemployed you must ch^efc *h«»
appropriate box below and attach the appropriate af f idavits.

Obligor Is unemployed - affidavit attached.
Obligor cannot be located j- affidavit attached.
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